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In August 2004, the International Crisis Group published a report concerning the 
Parliamentary elections scheduled for February 2005 in Kyrgyzstan. The document 
predicted that if President Askar Akaev attempted to "retain power, directly or indirectly, 
in fraudulent elections, serious unrest" would be likely. (1) The ICG further argued that 
Akaev would try to ensure that "loyal candidates" gained a majority of seats in the polls. 
(2) These predictions proved to be remarkably prescient, as the election campaign 
would be marked not only by nepotism, but also media harassment and the exclusion of 
several important opposition candidates.
 Barely two weeks before the election—in a move clearly designed to minimize the time 
for protest--both of President Akaev's children were nominated to stand in the ballot. Of 
the two, Akaev's daughter Bermet seemed the more likely candidate for succession, 
given her prior political experience. Akaeva had previously worked both as a United 
Nations employee and as a political consultant in Kyrgyzstan. In 2003, she co-founded 
Alga Kyrgyzstan, a pro-Presidential party. (3) Akaeva's candidacy revealed the true 
meaning behind Akaev's statement at Harvard in the fall of 2004 that "we do democracy 
the Kyrgyz way," and gave the lie to the statement that "I am for the people choosing the 
next president." (4)
Besides setting up a Kazakh style succession, Akaeva's candidacy was the tool for the 
exclusion from the election of a strong anti-Presidential opposition candidate, former 
Foreign Minister—and leader of Ata-Jurt Roza Otunbayeva. Otunbayeva's registration 
was accepted and then revoked within a matter of hours, with the excuse that she failed 
to meet Kyrgyz residential requirements as a result of her recent service as Deputy UN 
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Special Envoy to Georgia. (5) Otunbayeva's exclusion was suspicious because the 
district in which she was to run was taken over by Akaeva.
Otunbayeva's exclusion was merely the most high-profile of many. There were anti-
exclusion protests around the country, most notably in Jalal-Abad, Naryn and Issyk-Kul, 
where protestors blocked a major highway for five days, demanding the reinstatement 
of former Prime Minister Arslanbek Maliev. (6)
On February 8th, a Bishkek based newspaper, Moya Stolitsa Novosti (which was 
receiving funds from Freedom House) published an article alleging illegitimate business 
dealings on the part of President Akaev and his family. President Akaev's response to 
the article was to threaten litigation, and to accuse the outlet of "systematic information 
terror." (7)When the newspaper refused to print a retraction, the building housing its 
presses was suffered a 48 hour blackout, described by Freedom House as an attempt 
at "censorship." (8) When the blackout became public knowledge, protests (lasting 2 
days) occurred in Bishkek, demanding an end to media harassment. 
The harassment of 'regime opponents' and the media described above must be 
understood in a wider regional context. The Kyrgyz government's actions were the 
result of an ever-increasing paranoia brought about by fear that the Orange and Rose 
revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia would spread across the Caucasus into Central 
Asia. Comments made prior to the elections by Prime Minister Nikolai Tanayev and 
President Akaev support this conclusion. In an interview with Moscow Nezavisimaya 
gazeta in late January, Akaev alleged that Otunbayeva and her party had been, and 
continued to be recipients of funds from the United States. (9) Tanayev meanwhile, 
issued a direct warning to the OSCE that meddling or "interference" in the election by 
any foreign observer mission would not be tolerated. (10)
Voting in the Parliamentary elections began in the morning of 27th February. Preliminary 
turnout figures announced by the Kyrgyz Central Election Commission indicated that 
more than 50% of the country's eligible voters had cast their ballot for candidates 
competing for 75 seats. Results were inconclusive, with only 30 seats being decided. 
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This meant that a run-off, scheduled for 13th March would be necessary. (11) It was no 
surprise that the OSCE noted that the election had been marred by "low level of voter 
confidence," "bribing of voters," and the "widespread withdrawal of candidates from the 
election." (12) Despite these irregularities, the country was quiet in the days following 
the ballot, with the exception of a small protest in Bishkek, led by Otunbayeva.
But the calm was short-lived. On 4th March, a crowd numbering some 3000 people 
converged on Jalal-Abad's main square to protest government corruption, to voice 
support for Jusupbek Bakiev—brother of Kurmanbek Bakiev (leader of the People's 
Movement of Kyrgyzstan), who had been excluded from the ballot, and to call for 
Akaev's resignation. (13) The demonstration soon escalated into a riot, with the crowd 
occupying Provincial Administration Buildings and calling for Akaev's immediate 
resignation. Spurred on by events in Jalal-Abad, similar protests emerged in Osh, 
Aravan and Naryn. (14) At this point it should be noted that the crowds in Kyrgyzstan 
constituted a mob, rather than (as had been the case in Tblisi and Kiev) a politically led 
and organized movement.
Immediately following the second round of voting (which gave the government 50 of 75 
seats) the protests intensified further, as 10,000 people armed with fire-bombs and 
sticks stormed police headquarters in Jalal-Abad. Later the same day, OMON troops 
attempted to clear the building, but only succeeded in dispersing the crowd into other 
areas of the city, including the airport and suburbs. An interesting development was 
revealed in that the troops had been issued only with blank rather than live fire rounds, 
accounting for the almost negligible casualties. (15)
The failure of OMON troops to restore order resulted in the dispatch of Prime Minister 
Tanayev to Jalal-Abad as Akaev's negotiator on 22nd March, as well as the public 
announcement by Akaev that 'disputed' election results would be reviewed. He 
categorically refused, however, to resign. (16) Akaev's statements—anchored by the 
fact that the protests were confined to the South—probably amounted to an attempt to 
buy time to consolidate his position.
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Untouched by major protests thus far, rioting erupted in Bishkek on the morning of 
March 24th. A mob converged on the Presidential compound, storming the White House 
and the government-run television station Kyrgyz-TV, from where the announcement 
was made that the government had collapsed. Presidential guards apparently either 
melted away, or put up no resistance. (17) President Akaev fled to Moscow, where he 
currently remains.  Eyewitness accounts (notably from RFE/RL reporters in Bishkek) 
(18) make clear that the Bishkek protests were not organized and did not possess 
leadership. Instead, they were spontaneous expressions of anger at the regime, 
characterized by pitched street battles between pro and anti-Presidential crowds, looting 
and general "lawlessness and chaos." (19) Looting reportedly became so extreme that 
people from the countryside were streaming into the capital to participate.
Events as described above and in other reports raise serious questions: why were 
OMON troops carrying only blank rounds in Jalal-Abad? Why did Security Forces either 
disappear or refuse to fire on the mob at the government compound and Presidential 
residence when it was clear that the buildings—and thus the regime—were being 
targeted? The answer may lie in the persona of Feliks Kulov.
 Feliks Kulov's background and connections are essential to understanding the current 
climate and political situation in Kyrgyzstan. Born in 1948, Feliks Sharshenbayevich 
Kulov entered the Soviet Interior Ministry in 1967, reaching the position of Deputy 
Interior Minister in 1987. (20) In 1990, he was appointed Interior Minister of Kyrgyzstan, 
and in the following year, after the Soviet collapse, he was given the vice-Presidency. 
(21) In 1997, Kulov was appointed Minister of National Security, a post which gave him 
control over the National Security Service, Kyrgyzstan's successor to the KGB. It was in 
this period, that Kulov's loyalty first came under scrutiny, when surveillance equipment 
allocated by Kulov to a 'Special Task Force' disappeared inexplicably. (22) Having been 
demoted to Mayor of Bishkek by Akaev, Kulov resigned in 1999, and created his own 
political party, Ar-Namys (Dignity).
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After failing to win a seat in 2000's Parliamentary elections, Kulov announced his intent 
to run against Akaev in upcoming Presidential elections. This direct challenge to Akaev's 
authority resulted in Kulov's arrest on 22 March 2000. Charged with fraud, 
embezzlement and abuse of authority while Minister of National Security, Kulov was 
convicted by a Bishkek court, and sentenced to a seven-year prison term. (23) 
   
News reports on the rioting in Bishkek on 24th March indicate that Kulov was released 
from prison by the mob. (24) Although no mention is made of the Security Services' role 
in his release, it seems impossible that it could have occurred without their collusion. 
Moreover, it is entirely feasible that OMON troops and Presidential guards failed to stop 
the rioting because they realized the popular scope of the demonstrations, and because 
Kulov commanded their loyalty from within his cell. This conjecture is supported by 
events immediately following the storming of the White House. 
   
Just hours after the government's collapse, Kyrgyzstan's outgoing Parliament met in 
emergency session to appoint an interim leadership. After several hours of deliberation 
and voting, former Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiev was appointed interim President 
and Prime Minister, Roza Otunbayeva was appointed interim Foreign Minister, and 
Feliks Kulov was appointed to lead the country's entire law enforcement and security 
apparatus. Following his appointment Kulov, together with Bakiev, made a televised 
appearance to appeal for calm. Kulov unequivocally stated that any person or group 
who attempted to "destabilize the situation, to stir up trouble," would be prosecuted and 
punished "to the greatest extent of Kyrgyz law." (25) A curfew was introduced on 25th 
March, and the same day, a large police and presence—supported by "local volunteers" 
was once again visible on the streets. Within days, the capital was quiet once more. 
Kulov's appointment and the subsequent re-appearance of the police and security 
forces speak volumes about his position and authority in the country, and help explain 
events surrounding the Presidential Elections held later in the summer.  
   
Within days of the creation of the interim government, Kurmanbek Bakiev, leader of the 
People's Movement of Kyrgyzstan, announced his candidacy for Presidential Elections. 
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At the time of his release, Feliks Kulov refused to commit himself, announcing that he 
would wait until the Supreme Court ruled on the legality of his convictions. The hearings 
in Kulov's case began on 7th April, and, within a week, he was cleared of all charges. In 
the days immediately following the Supreme Court's judgements, Kulov and Bakiev met 
several times. According to reports which emerged from their discussions, the two men 
held discussions in which Bakiev offered to create a unified ticket, naming Kulov Prime 
Minister in the event of an electoral victory.(25) Kulov rejected this proposal. On April 
25th, he announced his own candidacy, stating that he and Bakiev had agreed to free 
and fair elections. 
   
Although a legitimate two-horse race was encouraging from a purely 'democratic' 
perspective, in the Kyrgyz context, it was concerning for two reasons:  Kyrygzstan is an 
ethnically—and geographically divided country. Kyrgyzstan's southern regions, 
particularly the cities of Osh and Jalal-Abad are home to a vocal Uzbek minority, 
numbering approximately 13.8% of the population. The region has witnessed ethnic 
riots in the past, most notably in 1990. Bakiev's power base is located in the Southern 
regions, while Kulov draws his support from the Northern part of the country—especially 
Bishkek and environs. As such, a Kulov-Bakiev race created the specter of national 
division—as well as the possibility—given Kulov's background—of Security Service 
interference in the polls.  
  
The possibility of ethnic tension affecting the Kyrgyz Republic was made starkly realistic 
by events in mid-May in neighboring Uzbekistan. Uzbek Interior Ministry and Army 
forces brutally repressed peaceful demonstrations in the town of Andijan on May 13th, 
killing at least 500 people. On the evening of 14th May, 546 people succeeded in 
escaping the sealed town, crossing the Kyrgyz border into Jalal-Abad on the morning of 
the 15th.  
   
On the evening of May 13th, the same day as the massacre, Kulov announced his 
withdrawal from the Presidential race. According to a statement released the following 
day, he had now agreed to the original terms offered by Bakiev. In the event that his 
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running-mate won the election, Kulov would be appointed Prime Minister. The 
agreement also provided that some Presidential powers (such as the authority to 
appoint and to dismiss Oblast heads and ministers) would be transferred to Kulov. 
   
It is important to note that the massacre in Uzbekistan and the subsequent arrival of 
refugees in Kyrgyzstan played a role in Kulov's decision. His statement noted the 
"fragility of peace" in Central Asia, and stated that the aim of cooperation was to "ensure 
that the interests of the whole of Kyrgyzstan are represented in the national 
leadership…it's our job to prevent a situation where one group of the population 
believes it has won, and the other thinks it has lost." (26)  This statement makes it clear 
that Bakiev and Kulov came to terms at least in part to reassure the Uzbek minority, and 
to prevent the spread of unrest across borders. Finally, it seems clear that Bakiev's 
concessions to Kulvo vis a vis increased powers constituted a bow to the latter's control 
over the Kyrgyz security forces.
  
Candidate registration for the election ended on July 7th. In total, seven candidates 
accumulated the required 50,000 signatures. Bakiev's competitors were: Zhusupbek 
Sharipov (formerly Governor of Jalal-Abad), Tursunbay Bakir-ulu (former Ombudsman), 
Keneshbek Dushebayev (former Interior Minister), Akbaraly Aitikeev, Jypar Jeksheev, 
and a lone female candidate, Toktayym Umetalieva. (27) When the vote-count had been 
completed, Bakiev was shown to have won a comprehensive victory. The CEC claimed 
that voter-turnout had reached a record high with some 74.6% of the country's eligible 
population going to the polls. Bakiev apparently obtained 88.9% of the vote, with the 
second-placed candidate, Bakir-ulu, receiving just under 4%. (28) It is clear that Kulov's 
withdrawal, and his backing of Bakiev, was at least partially responsible for the latter's 
huge majority. 
   
In its "Preliminary Findings" report, the OSCE's reaction to the election was quite 
favorable. Specifically, the organization noted that government interference in 
campaigning had been non-existent; that there had been a free exchange of ideas 
between the candidates in a series of live televised debates, that freedom of expression 
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and congregation had been respected, and that the government had taken account of 
the Uzbek minority by broadcasting the debates with Uzbek dubbing in the South of the 
country. Most remarkably, given the complicity of this organization in the fraudulent 
parliamentary elections, the OSCE noted that the Central Election Commission had 
attempted to show impartiality by moving out of government buildings for the duration of 
the election period. (29)   
   
Although the election showed a marked improvement over past campaigns, the OSCE's 
report was not free of criticism. Some irregularities were noted by observers, the most 
important of which was an inflation of turnout figures, which resulted in Bakiev's 
remarkably high returns. It should be noted however, that the OSCE believes that 
Bakiev's margin of victory would have been significant even without inflation. (30) 
   
Since the June 30th election, there have been several noteworthy developments. In 
conjunction with other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Kyrgyz 
government requested 'clarification' from Washington on the closure of the Manas and 
Ganci airbases near Bishkek. It soon became clear that Bishkek's demand was little 
more than a bargaining chip. On 25th July, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 
arrived in Kyrgyzstan for talks with the new government. The results of the talks were 
threefold: first, US forces can remain in Kyrgyzstan until the Afghan situation is 
'normalized'; second, Kyrgyzstan will receive a $200 million interest free-loan, and third, 
the United States and Kyrgyzstan will renew their cooperation on Defense-technology 
issues. (31) 
   
Kyrgyzstan's leaders have historically realized that they do not occupy a geo-political 
position of strength in Central Asia. The country, in contrast to some of its neighbors, 
does not possess natural resources, and is hampered by its small size. Kyrgyz foreign 
policy has—at least since 2001—centered on the idea of balance between Russia and 
the US. To offset the perceived impact of US presence, Kyrygzstan's government in late 
September renewed its basing agreement with the Russian Federation. Defense 
Minister Sergei Ivanov, and Colonel-General Anatoly Mazurkevich (head of International 
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Cooperation Agreements in the Defense Ministry), noted that Russia viewed the base at 
Kant as a "long-term project," and that Russia would be donating $3 million worth of 
military equipment to Kyrgyzstan immediately. Russia plans to allocate $4.5 million to 
new development projects at the airbase from the current budget. (32) 
   
Domestically, the newly elected government's first course of action was to begin a 
campaign against the country's rampant corruption. Speaking a day after his 
inauguration, President Bakiev urged officials to maintain "iron discipline" in their jobs, 
not to neglect their constituents, and to be more accountable. Anyone caught stripping 
people "of their property shamelessly," or taking bribes would be fired immediately.  (33)
Recent events have served to highlight the problem of corruption. On 21st September, 
Bayaman Erkinbayev, a long-serving and prominent parliamentarian was shot and killed 
in central Bishkek. Erkinbayev (a Bakiev ally) was also wealthy Southern-based 
businessman (owning several hotels and the Kurasu market in Osh), who had been the 
target of assassination attempts by political-business rivals in the past. (34) President 
Bakiev has claimed that the assassination was only made possible because "law-
enforcement agencies and bandits" were working together. This statement would seem 
to have some basis in fact, since the local Bishkek press has claimed that the Interior 
Ministry recently 'detained' Erkinbayev's bodyguards on undisclosed charges, a move 
which left him open to attack. (35) 
   
Bakiev has insisted since the assassination that "we must purge law enforcement 
agencies everywhere, be it the Security Service, Customs or courts." (36) Many 
mainstream media outlets in Europe and America have failed to note the details of the 
Bakiev-Kulov deal, which positioned Kulov as the 'power behind the throne.' It is 
possible that Bakiev is using the Erkinbayev assassination as the 'trigger' for an attempt 
to swing the balance of power back from Kulov to himself. 
   
Given the reality of the power-dynamic in Kyrgyzstan, it is unlikely that the Kulov-Bakiev 
partnership will remain in place for long. Realistically, Bakiev has little chance of winning 
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a real power struggle. The two questions are for how long Kulov will tolerate his 
presence—or for how long Bakiev will suffer being number-two, and whether the Kulov-
Bakiev struggle will supersede the anti-corruption campaign which was the centerpiece 
of Bakiev's manifesto. 
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